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TESTING THE LIMITS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT
James J. Fyfe*
THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT. By Hans Zeisel Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press. 1982. Pp. xvi, 245. $20.
As Hans Zeise! reminds us early on, he is a scholar of no small
repute. In 1966, he coauthored The American Jury, 1 a study that has,
he notes in the second sentence of his latest book, "become the standard work on that institution which forms the final stage in the law
enforcement process" (p. 3). Zeisel also wrote Say It With Figures, 2
an extremely popular and useful guide for those who wish to present
statistical data in a manner comprehensible to readers who lack extensive quantitative skills.
According to Zeisel, The Limits ofLaw Enforcement "illuminates
the twilight zone in which criminal cases are disposed of without
trial," and "is thus a companion volume to The American Jury" (p.
3). Exploring this twilight zone is important because the great majority of criminal cases terminate there, either by dismissal or by negotiated pleas of guilty before they reach the trial stage. Thus, when
an accomplished scholar such as Zeisel obtains access to a large and
rich set of data on this usually invisible process, the published results
of his analyses are almost certain to be valuable. That is especially
so because Zeisel adheres to the principles of Say It With Figures
and presents his quantitative analyses in a non-technical manner directed at the widest possible audience.3
Zeisel analyzes two sets of original data collected by the Vera
* Associate Professor, The American University School of Justice; Senior Fellow, The
Police Foundation. B.S. 1971, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New
York; M.S. 1972, Ph.D. 1978, State University of New York at Albany. Professor Fyfe served
for sixteen years as an officer in the New York City Police Department. - Ed.
1. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY {1966).
2. H. ZEISEL, SAY IT WITH FIGURES {5th ed. 1968).
3. Such a non-technical approach to data analysis involves, of course, a trade-off. The bar
graphs and simple tables presented by Zeisel are easily understood by lay readers, but each
such figure or table can analyze relationships among only a small number of variables. As a
result, use of these methods to analyze complex data requires many more figures and tables
than is true of more sophisticated techniques capable of simultaneously analyzing relationships among greater numbers of variables. Included in the 245 pages of The Limits of Law
Enforcement, for example, are 63 bar graph figures and seven tables. Given the audience at
whom Zeisel directed The Limits of Law Enforcement, however, his decision to avoid "even
statistical tables because tables make difficult reading," and to include instead "figures which
convey the statistical evidence without pain and perhaps even with pleasure," p. 4, was wise.
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Institute of Justice. 4 The first includes records of a random sample
ofl,888 felony arrests effected in four of New York City's five boroughs during 1971. The second includes records and interviews with
principles in 369 cases involving arraignments on felony charges that
were disposed of in New York City Criminal Court or New York
City branches of the state supreme court during January through
October 1973.5 Perhaps anticipating that many of the law enforcement policymakers and practitioners among those at whom he directs his book have neither the time nor the inclination to read it
from cover to cover, Zeise! presents his "Summary and Reflections"
in Chapter One. Here he assures us that his ten-year-old New York
City data are generalizable to other times· and places. He points out
that the similarities between New York City and other places include
more than arrest and clearance rates: almost half of the felony arrests in his study resulted in dismissals, a finding much like those
reported by other studies in New York City in 1926, in Cleveland in
1919, and, more recently, in California, Oregon, New Orleans, and
Washington, D.C. Further, he informs us, such surprisingly high
dismissal rates are not uniquely American; he cites Austrian and
German dismissal rates for robbery that are strikingly similar to the
American felony dismissal rates he quotes (pp. 19-25). 6
Before cases can reach court disposition, of course, the police
must arrest. Zeise! presents arrest rate data for the seven Uniform
_Crime Report index felonies7 which show that, in New York City, as
in other places, one of the major limits of law enforcement is its inability to solve more than a small fraction of the crimes that occur:
only one in eight (twelve percent) of the index offenses reported to
New York City police results in arrest (p. 30). Absent radical and
"politically and financially improbable" expansion of the police,
4. These data are also analyzed by the Vera Institute of Justice in FELONY ARRESTS (rev.
ed. 1981), which examines the "deterioration" of New York City felony cases between charges
at arrest and final disposition.
5. In this instance, too, the data originated in four of New York's boroughs, and did not
include cases from Staten Island, the smallest borough which, according to Zeise!, "generates
only 2 percent of the city's felony arrests." P. 8. Further, as Zeise! notes, because these 369
cases include only those that reached final disposition in the criminal or supreme court, the
sample excludes cases terminated by other means (for example, diverted to the family court;
disposed of in the Complaint Room; dismissed by grand juries; grand juries failed to indict), or
not reaching final disposition because defendants died or jumped bail. Pp. 10-11. The omission of these cases, of course, means that the dismissal percentages presented by Zeise! understate to some unknown degree the actual percentage of felony arrests that do not result in
successful prosecutions or pleas of guilty.
6. I needed no convincing as to the similarities between the performance of New York
City's criminal justice system and those of other places. I am a former New York City police
officer and, like many who have practiced and studied law enforcement in New York City, I
have long held the view that the major difference between it and other, smaller jurisdictions is
the speed with which data sets large enough for meaningful quantitative analysis accumulate.
7. Murder/non-negligent manslaughter; rape; aggravated assault; robbery; burglary; larceny; auto larceny.

February 1984]

Limits of Law Enforcement

1115

Zeisel argues, this relatively low rate of success8 is not likely to increase significantly (p. 34), because most arrests for .index crimes occur during police responses to citizens' telephone reports that crimes
are in progress. Thus, the probability of arrest is largely a function
of prompt citizen reporting and of police speed, luck, and skill.9 In
cases in which arrests are not effected by responding patrol officers,
Zeisel indicates, solution is unlikely because, despite the most intensive investigative efforts, it is usually impossible to identify and locate unknown offenders once they have fled the crime scenes (pp. 29,
31).
The major reason for the New York City dismissals, according to
Zeisel, is "evidence insufficiency," primarily involving the loss of the
cooperation of the crimes' victims (pp. 25-28). Zeisel's data also indicate that exclusion of evidence because of illegal searches is a relatively minor factor in prosecutorial failure in New York City: six
cases (9.1 percent of the sixty-six dismissals for which he was able to
ascertain the reasons for failure) were dismissed because "possession
or ownership [was] difficult to prove" (p. 111). Motions to suppress
evidence on grounds of illegal search were made in two of the
twenty-four weapons cases among Zeisel's sample of 369, and both
were denied (pp. 190-92). This pattern, too, is similar to those reported in other places and times, 10 and also suggests that the procedural safeguards of the exclusionary rule only slightly weaken
prosecutors' chances for success.
Zeisel reports that pleas of guilty account for ninety-eight percent
of the convictions in the cases studied (p. 34), another pattern not
8. As Zeise! observes, not all of these offenses are reported to the police, so that "the ratio
of arrests to the number of committed crimes is considerably lower'' than twelve percent. P. 31
(emphasis in original).
9. The police literature of the 1960's and early 1970's generally placed great emphasis on
police response time as an effective means of solving crimes, and urged police agencies to
reduce response time to an absolute minimum. See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 71-72 (1967); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK FORCE ON POLICE, REPORT ON POLICE
193 (1973). More recent work, however, suggests that these recommendations were based
upon incomplete definitions of response time. Police have generally defined and measured
response time in terms of the period between their receipt of a crime report and the arrival of
the officers on the scene, and have assumed that citizens promptly report offenses. Research in
Kansas City and elsewhere indicates that this assumption is unfounded, and that crime victims
often notify family and friends before calling the police, often for as long as an hour after they
have been victimized. See 3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JusTICE, RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS, PART II CRIME ANALYSIS 1-9 (1978). The implications of
these findings, of course, are that the relationship between response time (as traditionally defined) and probability of arrest is even more haphazard than Zeise! suggests, and that efforts to
reduce response time should focus more heavily on educating citizens to report crimes as
quickly as possible.
10. See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (1982); see also Wicker, Exploding a Myth, N.Y. Times, May
10, 1983, at A25, col 5.
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unique to New York City. 11 There are several reasons for this mode
of disposing of cases. Prosecutors, concerned with heavy caseloads
and with the difficulty of proving cases in which police officers have
booked arrestees for "the reasonable maximum" from among a variety of feasible charges (p. 195), prefer to devote their attention and
efforts to trying cases of the greatest severity and with the highest
potential for obtaining convictions. Defendants and their attorneys,
of course, have different interests. They are generally not concerned
with such systemic matters, but rather seek the best possible disposition of their individual cases and plead guilty to avoid severe
sentences and the inclusion of felony convictions on the defendant's
record. 12
Zeise! indicates that police charge arrestees with the maximum
feasible offenses for two major reasons. First, they assume that the
heaviest possible charges will increase prosecutors' leverage in subsequent plea bargaining. Second, officers' performance ratings (especially those of detectives and other investigators) are based in part
upon the seriousness of the offenses they clear by arrest. A third
and, according to Zeisel, less significant reason for charging the maximum is ''the structure of overtime pay" (p. 196). Officers who effect
arrests for misdemeanors may often do so quite quickly by issuing
summonses at police facilities, a process that usually requires no further involvement on the part of police. During the period studied by
Zeisel, however, officers who effected felony arrests were required to
proceed to court with their arrestees, to assist in the drawing of complaints, and to be present at the initial appearances. fa 1971, a felony arrest effected late on a busy Friday night might require the
officer involved to spend several hours preparing paperwork and
lodging his prisoner that evening. Early Saturday morning, he would
then proceed with his prisoner to court, and take a place on a line of
several hundred arresting officers waiting to have complaints drawn
and to appear at their prisoners' initial appearances. Quite oft~n, his
case would not be reached on Saturday, so that he would have to
resume his place in line again on Sunday (and, sometimes, again on
Monday). Some unscrupulous officers learned to manipulate this
11. A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ISSUES AND IRONIES 169 (2d ed. 1979), summarizes
data from a Georgetown University Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure study of plea
bargaining. In 10 of the 24 jurisdictions for which data are presented, pleas of guilty accounted for more than 90 percent of the convictions of felony defendants.
12. See, for example, Donald J. Newman's excellent American Bar Foundation study of
plea bargaining, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL (1966). However, a persuasive argument that criminal defense attorneys do not always
intensely seek the best possible dispositions for individual defendants, but instead avoid heated
negotiation with prosecutors and judges in order to preserve their good relationship and their
future bargaining power with these officials is made by Abraham S. Blumberg in The Practice
ofLaw as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, l LAW & Socv. REV,
15 (1967).
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system by arresting and overcharging persons an hour or two before
the end of their last tours of duty, so that their long weekend court
waits (sometimes spent on folding lawn chairs kept in the trunks of
their personal autos for such occasions) would result in two or three
days of overtime pay. 1J
Until the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis, when the police department began to monitor officers' overtime closely, to hold local
commanders accountable for reducing it, to streamline arrest procedures, and to reduce officers' charging discretion, "collars for dollars" were probably a far more significant influence on the arrest and
charging process than Zeise! suggests. Further, Zeisel's findings that
only seven percent of those who pleaded guilty were convicted of the
offenses with which they were originally charged, and that the guilty
pleas resulted in convictions of offenses that averaged 2.3 New York
State Penal Law classes lower than original charges (p. 131) may also
have been influenced by the low quality of some of the "collars for
dollars" among the felony arrests he studied.
Zeisel conducts an interesting analysis of the relationship between the bail system and the guilty plea process. It has been frequently argued that those held without bail or unable to post bail
suffer higher conviction rates than defendants released on bail because incarcerated defendants are unable to assist their attorneys in
preparation of their defenses. 14 Consequently, it is probable that incarcerated defendants are encouraged to plead guilty in order to
avoid the convictions and long sentences that may follow upon a
poorly prepared defense. Zeisel, however, reports "a more direct
connection" (p. 48) between pretrial detention and pleas of guilty.
Defense attorneys, he finds, frequently negotiate guilty pleas on the
promise of sentences of "time [already] served" (p. 48) during pretrial detention. This usually occurs in cases of lesser felonies and, he
notes, should not lessen criticism of the inequities of the money bail
system, because it involves exertion upon incarcerated defendants of
prosecutorial leverage not available in cases in which defendants are
free pending trial (pp. 47-49).
Zeisel's observations make sense, but my experiences as an arresting officer in New York City suggest that the relationships
among detention in lieu of bail, pleas of guilty, and sentences of time
served are also directly and heavily influenced by another factor,
and that this process is often not as one-sided as Zeisel suggests. The
13. In one case I know of, a patrol precinct commander found that his officers had effected
three such "collars for dollars" within a few days. All three arrests involved apprehension of
young men charged with felony auto larceny for removing parts from the same previously
stolen and partially stripped automobile, which had been abandoned on the street and was
awaiting removal by the city's sanitation department.
14. PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 38 (1967).
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guilty plea for time served often occurs in iron-clad prosecution
cases against experienced defendants who offer to plead guilty after
having spent relatively short periods of time in local detention facilities. In such cases, defendants are not without bargaining leverage.
First, they appeal to prosecutors' and judges' 15 concerns with the
strained capacity of detention facilities. Second, they know that the
time that passes during their pretrial detention is likely to weaken
witnesses' and victims' memories and willingness to cooperate with
prosecutors and, hence, will weaken the cases against them. Consequently, they are often successful in bargaining for release in less
time than would have been true had they been free on bail and
served their time after a guilty plea or jury conviction.
My impression is shared by most of my former colleagues. If we
are correct, the question of the effects of the bail system on defendants' decisions to plead guilty is not adequately answered by correlating pretrial detention and likelihood of conviction. Instead, we
also need to know whether those who plead guilty after pretrial confinement serve more time and suffer more deprivation - in terms of
degree of isolation and loss of prior relationships - than is true of
those free on bail or personal recognizance prior to conviction. 16
Despite these criticisms, Zeisel's interpretations of his New York
City data and his conclusion that there is relatively little that the
police, prosecutors, and courts can do to lower significantly the level
of crime (pp. 51-52) are generally quite sound. At other points, however, Zeise! is less than objective. Much of the book's first chapter,
for example, is a discussion of deterrence. In it, he argues that there
is no evidence that the death penalty serves as a deterrent to murder,
or that it has any effect on homicide rates, and that those who suggest otherwise are off-base or even "arrogant" (p. 63). As one who
opposes the death penalty, and who remains to be convinced that it
has a deterrent effect or that errors can be avoided, I would like very
much to agree with Zeisel's conclusion that his analyses show that
execution is not a deterrent. They do not. Instead, like analyses that
purport to show that capital punishment does deter, 17 his analyses
15. Zeisel reports that judges took part in negotiations in 79 percent of the 586 guilty pleas
in which defendants were promised specific sentences during plea negotiations. Pp. 133-34,
16. A variable worthy of examination in analysis of the relationships among the bail system, plea bargaining, and likelihood of conviction is conditions of incarceration in local detention facilities vis-a-vis those in state prisons. The defendant incarcerated prior to conviction is
near home, better positioned to receive visits from friends and family, and more likely to find
that his fellow inmates include friends from the outside than is the convict confined in a distant
state prison. Despite the generally poor conditions that prevail in local facilities, persons I have
arrested have told me that they would rather spend a year in Rikers Island (the major New
York City jail and detention facility) hoping to "wear down" complaining witnesses over the
course of frequent court dates and adjournments than plead guilty and risk two or three years
in Attica Prison, which is located in a rural area approximately 450 miles from New York City.
17. See, e.g., Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REV. 397 (1975).
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show nothing.
At one point, Zeisel contrasts 1960-69 data which show that
homicide rates in "states with executions" were higher than in
"states without executions" (p. 61). So what? Such an analysis assumes that capital punishment is the only variable that influences
homicide rates, ignoring the question of whether homicide rates in
"states with execution" are attributable to social and cultural variables other than whether states have capital punishment statutes.
Zeisel subsequently acknowledges that "the causes of crime have
proved difficult to identify and are relatively broad in scope" (p. 72).
How, then, do data showing that homicide rates in "execution states"
were higher than in "non-execution states" support his conclusion
that capital punishment is not a deterrent? These data say nothing
about whether homicide rates in "execution states" would have been
even higher if not for the existence of their capital punishment
statutes.
There are more important problems with Zeisel's analysis of the
question of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. First, rates of
"homicide" and rates of "homicide punishable by death" are two
very different things. The FBI homicide rates included in Zeisel's
analysis include varieties of that broad legal category (such as nonnegligent manslaughter) not punishable by death even in "execution
states," and the frequency of such non-capital homicides is irrelevant
to analysis of the deterrent effect of capital punishment: to what degree can we expect death penalty statutes to deter crimes not punishable by death under the authority of those statutes?
Second, Zeisel's analysis fails to take into account the fact that
the mere existence of a statute authorizing capital punishment for a
few forms of homicide has not meant that capital punishment is actually available to the state when persons are convicted of those offenses. Zeisel presents and analyzes homicide data from 1960-1979
(pp. 60-63), a period that he notes included "a decade [1967-1977]
4uring which the death penalty was in limbo" (p. 60). How then can
he argue that we may distinguish between "states with execution"
and "states without execution" during those years? In fact, for half
of the period Zeisel analyzes, there were no "states with execution."
Further, while Zeisel notes that "the latest surge in the homicide rate
begins at about the time [1977] we began executing again" (p. 60), he
fails to acknowledge that the data he presents also show a far greater
surge in homicide rates between 1967 and 1968, when "execution
states" stopped executing. 18
18. See p. 61. Zeisel asserts that the 1977 execution of Gary Gilmore was a "most dramatic shift to a more severe sentence [that] failed to deter." P. 63. Despite the great publicity
and drama that accompanied this event, it is doubtful that strident supporters of capital punishment would regard the Gilmore execution as an appropriate starting point from which to
test their theory that capital punishment deters. Much of the controversy over Gilmore's exe-
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Zeisel's discussion of deterrence of non-capital offenses is often
equally unconvincing and, like those who propose stiff legislation on
the ground that it deters, he confuses the existence of a law with the
will or capacity to enforce it. He points out that the severe penalties
for possession and sale of heroin enacted by New York State in
1973 19 have apparently had little or no effect on heroin trafficking or
use, and that "[s]erious property crime of the sort often associated
with heroin users increased sharply between 1973 and 1975; the rise
in New York was similar to increases in nearby states" (p. 64).20
Those statements are correct, but Zeisel's explanations of the reasons
for the penalties' ineffectiveness are not.
Even before they were enacted, it was predictable that the revised
New York State drug laws would have little effect on drug offenses
or drug trafficking because the stiffer penalties they provided applied
to only a very limited number of upper-level drug offenders. Furthermore, despite the promises of those who proposed and enacted
these laws, there was no way in which they could deter "property
crime of the sort often associated with heroin use": the new laws
simply failed to address property crimes in any significant manner.
In addition, in his discussion of the drug law revisions, he does
not address the question of whether the new statutes had any real
effects on law enforcement or on sentencing of those few drug offenders they affect. The fact is that they did not. The new laws did
not increase the capacity of the police to apprehend greater numbers
of violators. Nor, apparently because prosecutors and judges were
"unenthusiastic" about the new laws, were violators who were apprehended more likely to serve time than was previously true. 21
cution concerned his own expressed wish to die at the state's hands. It is not likely, therefore,
that more typical potential murderers (who presumably wish to avoid execution) would view
his death as a signal that their own contemplated acts might end in execution. Further, the
Gilmore execution hardly marked the resumption of regular and frequent executions in the
United States (at least not during the years studied by Zeisel). Only three murderers (including Gilmore) were executed during the three years that followed the resumption of capital
punishment and the end of the period covered by the data Zeisel presents. Two of these murderers (Gilmore and Jesse Bishop, who was executed by Nevada in 1978) literally demanded
their own deaths. Only one (John Spenkelink, who was executed by Florida in 1979) actively
participated in attempts to prevent his execution.
19. The New York State drug laws were modified in 1973 to allow for minimum prison
sentences of 15 to 25 years for possession of more than two ounces or sale of more than one
ounce of heroin. Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 276, § 9(3)(a)(i), 1973 N.Y. Laws 1040, 1045, 1052-53
(codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 70.00(3)(a)(i), 220.21, 220.43 (McKinney 1975 &
Supp. 1983)). Here again, Zeisel apparently overlooks the fact that these laws deal with only a
very limited category of "drug-related crime" and, even if enforced as written, would have
little or no deterrent effect on lesser drug crimes and on drug-related property crimes.
20. Summarizing findings of the Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation of
the Association of the Bar of New York City, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW
YORK EXPERIENCE (Final Report 1978).
21. Id. at 23. The report further notes that
New York City suffered from heavy congestion of its court system prior to the enactment
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Thus, the revised New York drug laws were not much more than
paper changes that had little or no effect on the certainty of punishment, and that increased the severity of punishment for only a handful of offenders. Consequently, they do not provide a basis for
Zeisel's conclusion that more severe punishment does not deter serious offenders.
Zeisel's analysis of the deterrent effects of the New York drug
laws (and his analysis of capital punishment statutes) would be very
valuable if they exposed the fraudulent and overblown predictions of
those who propose and enact such laws. Instead, he proceeds as
though capital punishment laws and stiff drug laws were fully implemented and actually did make things worse for more than a very few
offenders, and concludes that sentence increases have "dubious deterrent power" against serious crimes (p. 64).
In doing so, he overlooks the fact that statutes authorizing heavy
sentences for serious offenses are of dubious deterrent value because
they rarely effect a difference on practice and because serious offenders perceive as almost nil the probability of suffering severe penalties. As Zeisel points out, few serious offenders are apprehended,
and few of those apprehended suffer the maximum allowable penalties for their offenses. That is so because we lack the capacity and
the will to enforce the laws defining and authorizing punishment for
many serious offenses. That has not been so where lesser offenses which have been deterred by more severe punishments - are
concerned.
Speeding, parking violations, and drunk driving are relatively
easy to detect and to punish as heavily as the laws allow without
strain on either the capacity or the conscience of our law enforcement apparatus. Two officers with a radar gun can deter virtually
everyone using a major highway from committing speeding offenses.
When their prevention efforts fail, the officers can quickly and efficiently cite violators; when those violators appear in court, judges
who order maximum penalties do not strain the system or drain its
resources. To the contrary, they increase its revenues. Further, it is
of the 1973 law. In any state or city suffering from similar court congestion, it would make
little difference whether laws like New York's were passed or not. If enacted, such statutes would be likely to founder in the implementation process; the major result would
probably be an increase in the amount of money spent. . . .
The key lesson to be drawn from the experience with the 1973 drug law is that passing a
new law is not enough. What criminal statutes say matters a great deal, but the efficiency,
morale, and capacity of the criminal justice system is even more of a factor in determining
whether the law is effectively implemented. Whatever hope there is that statutes like the
1973 revision can deter antisocial behavior must rest upon swift and sure enforcement and
a dramatic increase in the odds that violators will in fact be punished. Until New York's
criminal justice process is reformed so that it can do its work with reasonable speed and
reasonable certainty, the Legislature does not in reality have serious policy options to
choose from. Without implementation there is no policy; there are only words.
Id. at 25.
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likely that severe penalties deter lesser offenses because most of those
they affect stand to gain little, but lose much, by their offenses. The
speeder's offense, for example, gains him only a few minutes, but
involves the risk of a delay on the spot, a day in court, a fine, a
license suspension, and insurance premium increases or cancellation.
Most of the serious offenders studied by Zeisel face a different
cost-benefit analysis. As he points out, serious crime is predominantly an activity of young males at "the bottom of the socioeconomic scale" (p. 81 ). Crime thrives "in the slums and ghettos of the
city" (p. 83), where the young too often have little to lose, and too
often learn early of law enforcement's ineffectiveness in preventing,
detecting, and punishing the serious criminal acts by which they
might gain money and prestige.
The conditions of the ghetto and the cost-benefit analysis they
generate are the bottom line of Zeisel's book: he knows, as does anyone who has thought about or studied crime, that the ghettos are,
and have been for generations, the breeding ground for much of the
violence and theft that affects us all. Even though his reasoning is
sometimes lacking in depth and objectivity, in his final analysis,
Zeise! is correct: unless we officially recognize and make serious attempts to ameliorate the terrible conditions of the ghetto, we are
fighting a losing battle against crime.
Crime, suggests Zeisel, is much like physical disease (pp. 84-85).
He is right: like the causes of cancer, the causes of crime are statistical and complex, and not everybody exposed to those causes becomes afflicted. We have long demanded that the medical
establishment attempt to identify and remedy carcinogenic conditions. Because we seek to protect future generations from becoming
afflicted with cancer, we would be dissatisfied with a medical establishment that merely attempted to identify and treat those already
afflicted. We have not gotten that message where crime is concerned: we have a good idea of what the major causes of crime are,
and where to find them, but we ignore them. Instead, we persist in
fighting crime only by assigning our law enforcement establishment
the impossible task of attempting to identify and treat those already
afflicted.
Zeisel's book is a demonstration of the limits of that approach.
Like the cancer victim, the individual afflicted by criminogenic conditions is often identified only after it is too late for treatment. Unlike the cancer victim, however, the criminal does not volunteer
himself for treatment. Instead, he resists identification and, while we
search for him, he victimizes others. Zeisel correctly insists that we
must take a cue from the medical establishment, and attempt to remedy the criminogenic conditions in which so many of our people live.
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If we do not heed him, we fail not only ourselves, but future generations as well.

